Pipelines
The bypass arithmetic.
Three pipelines route Gulf crude around the Strait of Hormuz. Their combined nameplate capacity is about 8.85 million barrels a day against a normal Hormuz flow of about 14.7 million barrels of crude and condensate. None of the three is marked offline. The last rates we have add up to about 7.31 million barrels a day, roughly 50% of normal Hormuz crude flow. Petroline’s rate is the Saudi energy minister’s from 6 October; ADCOP’s is Argus’s from 15 May. No flow figure is published for Goreh-Jask Pipeline, so it’s left out of the total. Full figures below.
Pipeline bypass.
PipelinesThe three pipelines that route Gulf crude around the Strait of Hormuz, when they are running. Combined nameplate capacity is the outer limit on how much oil can move by pipe; how much of it is actually available depends on each line’s status, shown below. Utilization figures, and the spare-capacity and stranded volumes derived from them, are editorial estimates built on EIA reference capacities, not live pipeline telemetry. Nameplate capacity against normal flow is a different basis than the cushion below, which is the unused headroom left once current running rates are assumed, so the two numbers will not match. EIA itself puts the Saudi and UAE lines together at about 4.7 million b/d of bypass capacity available in a disruption, a different basis again. Treat the cushion as the pessimistic end of a range, not as a measurement.
Saudi Arabia · Yanbu (Red Sea)
Petroline (East-West Pipeline)
7.00M bpd
Partial · 83% util (est., 6 October)
Saudi energy minister via Al Jazeera, Reuters and The National (6 Oct 2026), Bloomberg (12 Oct 2026); Kpler via Reuters (29 Sep 2026); capacity: Al Jazeera (12 Apr 2026) →Saudi Aramco's East-West Pipeline carries Arabian Light from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea, the single largest non-Hormuz route for Gulf crude. Saudi Arabia shut it as a precaution on 11 September 2026 after drones launched from Iraq struck it in the Riyadh and Medina areas, damaging pipeline equipment. Pumping restarted at a low rate on 22 September and tanker loadings at Yanbu resumed in the last week of September. Reuters reported on 29 September that two trade sources put Yanbu crude loadings at about 2 million barrels a day, and that Kpler estimated flow through the line at about 2.65 million barrels a day against roughly 5.5 million before the attack. On 6 October Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman told the GCC forum in Manama the line was back up to 5.8 million barrels a day as of that morning, and Bloomberg repeated the figure on 12 October. The utilization shown is that 5.8 million against the 7 million nameplate. It is the minister's figure with no independent check: nobody else has confirmed it, and it measures throughput, not exports. Kpler's 2.65 million, as of 28 September, is the last independent reading.
United Arab Emirates · Fujairah (Gulf of Oman)
ADCOP (Habshan-Fujairah)
1.50M bpd
Operational · 100% util (est., 15 May)
Argus Media (15 May 2026) →Argus reported on 15 May 2026 that the line was running at about 1.7 to 1.8 million barrels a day, above its 1.5 million nameplate. We have found no later figure for the line.
Iran · Jask (Gulf of Oman)
Goreh-Jask Pipeline
350k bpd
Partial · no published rate
No published flow figure exists. S&P Global counted at least six tanker loadings at Jask from March to July 2026 on satellite images.
Combined bypass capacity (nameplate) is 8.85 M bpd, roughly 60% of normal Hormuz crude flow. On the last rates we have, the lines carry 7.31 M bpd, oil that moves by pipe and does not transit the strait. Their unused capacity is 1.19 M bpd, roughly 8.1% of normal Hormuz crude flow. If the strait closed, the remaining 13.51 M bpd would strand.
Spare cushion
8.1%
unused pipeline capacity, of 14.70 M bpd normal crude + condensate flow
Saudi Arabia
Petroline.
East–West pipeline · Abqaiq → Yanbu
7.0 mbpd
nameplate capacity
Petroline is the backbone of any Hormuz bypass scenario. It runs roughly 1,200 kilometres east-to-west across the Arabian peninsula, from the Abqaiq processing complex in the Eastern Province to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu. Nameplate capacity is 7.0 mbpd, per Saudi Arabia's energy ministry. Actual throughput depends on the line's status day to day; see the live panel above for the current figure.
In a Hormuz closure, Petroline is the largest single bypass tool available to the global system. Crude arriving at Yanbu still has to transit Bab-el-Mandeb to reach Asian markets, which means a coincident Red Sea disruption (Houthi missile and drone activity, for instance) compounds the chokepoint problem rather than relieving it.
The 2019 Abqaiq strikes demonstrated the upstream vulnerability: a successful attack on the processing facility removes Petroline's feedstock entirely, regardless of the pipeline's own integrity.
United Arab Emirates
ADCOP.
Habshan → Fujairah
1.5 mbpd
nameplate capacity
The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline runs roughly 360 kilometres from the inland Habshan field complex to the Fujairah export terminal on the Indian Ocean coast, south of the strait. Operated by ADNOC, ADCOP gives the UAE the only Indian-Ocean export route from the peninsula and is the more strategically located of the two major bypass lines, since Fujairah cargoes immediately access Asian destinations without further chokepoint exposure.
Effective utilisation is constrained by upstream supply allocation rather than pipeline capacity per se. ADCOP ran at extended periods of partial utilisation during the 2010s and was used near nameplate during the 2019 tanker incidents in the strait.
Iran
Goreh–Jask.
Goreh → Jask (Gulf of Oman)
0.35 mbpd
nameplate; no published flow figure
Iran's Goreh-Jask line was inaugurated in 2021 and is intended to give the country an Indian-Ocean export option that avoids Hormuz. Nameplate capacity is roughly 0.35 million barrels per day. No flow figure is published for the line. S&P Global counted at least six tanker loadings at Jask from March to July 2026 on satellite images.
Strategically, Goreh-Jask matters less for the short run (the volume is small) and more for what it signals: even Iran, the country with the most coercive stake in the strait being closeable, is working on its own bypass.
Iraq · Türkiye
Kirkuk–Ceyhan.
Iraq → Ceyhan (Mediterranean)
0.9 mbpd
nameplate; intermittent flow
The Iraq–Türkiye Pipeline runs from Kirkuk in northern Iraq through Türkiye to the Ceyhan terminal on the Mediterranean. Nameplate is roughly 0.9 mbpd; in practice it has spent long stretches partially or wholly offline due to a combination of arbitration disputes between Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Ankara, plus periodic damage from regional conflict.
It is the only major bypass route that reaches the Mediterranean directly, which makes it strategically attractive in a Hormuz closure scenario, but the operational reliability is the worst of any pipeline in this set. A return to nameplate operation requires upstream political alignment that has not been the base case for most of the past decade.
Egypt
SUMED + Suez.
Ain Sukhna → Sidi Kerir + Suez Canal
2.5 mbpd
SUMED nameplate · Suez carries additional crude on tankers
The SUMED Pipeline (Suez–Mediterranean Pipeline) runs roughly 320 kilometres from Ain Sukhna on the Red Sea to Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean, allowing very large crude carriers that cannot transit the Suez Canal fully laden to discharge at one end and reload at the other. SUMED's nameplate is about 2.5 mbpd; the Suez Canal itself carries additional crude and refined product directly on smaller tankers.
For a Hormuz closure, SUMED is a re-routing tool rather than a bypass: it requires that crude has already reached the Red Sea via Petroline (Yanbu) or the Cape route. The compounding chokepoint risk (Houthi missile and drone activity in the southern Red Sea, plus any Suez disruption) means SUMED works as a reliever only when the Red Sea remains operational. In recent years this has been an inconstant assumption.
The arithmetic
Cushion, not replacement.
Combined nameplate bypass capacity from the Gulf-side pipelines is roughly 8.85 mbpd against normal Hormuz crude and condensate flow of 14.7 mbpd. the lines’ last stated rates add up to about 7.31 mbpd, roughly 50% of normal flow. Nameplate on the lines still running is 8.85 mbpd; how much of that is unused headroom depends on their own utilisation, shown above. The Mediterranean-side relief routes (Kirkuk-Ceyhan 0.9 + SUMED 2.5) add nominal capacity but require crude already on the right side of the strait or on the Red Sea, and both have their own reliability constraints.
Bypass therefore caps the floor of the disruption rather than removing it. SPR drawdowns can add another 5–7 mbpd for 30–60 days. Demand destruction closes the rest of the gap, principally through prices, which is why a Hormuz closure is read at consumers as a price shock, not a volume shock.
Petroline’s 7.0 mbpd is the Saudi energy ministry’s figure; ADCOP’s and Goreh-Jask’s are operator nameplates. EIA’s chokepoints briefing counts about 4.7 mbpd of Saudi and UAE capacity as usable bypass. Utilisation and status are straits.live estimates.