The Strait of Hormuz transit fee.

How much Iran is charging.

Reporting in mid-2026 puts the charge at roughly $1 million to $2 million per vessel, per voyage, with the exact figure scaled to the size of the ship, the type of cargo, and the volume carried. A fully laden crude tanker sits at the top of that range; smaller vessels pay less. The payments began after Iran rolled out a new traffic management mechanism over 14–17 May 2026.

In the economics of a single large-tanker voyage the fee is real but not, on its own, decisive. It lands on top of war-risk insurance that trade press already places in the $2 to $3 million range per Hormuz transit. The fee and the premium together are what an operator weighs against the alternative of not going at all.

Who collects it.

The mechanism is run by a newly created body, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). Vessels seeking passage apply in advance, disclosing ownership, insurance, crew manifest, and cargo, and are issued a permit only once they are vetted and scheduled. In practice that turns transit into a gated, case-by-case approval rather than the open passage the strait offered before the crisis. Iran has selectively cleared vessels tied to a small set of states while the bulk of global carriers stay away.

The United States responded by sanctioning the Iranian entity administering the charges, treating the toll apparatus itself as a target rather than recognizing it as a legitimate fee for service.

Tolls, or “navigational services”?

Iran is careful with the word. Its foreign ministry has said plainly that it does not charge tolls, while adding that “services will be provided” that “require charging fees.” The distinction is not just rhetoric. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, ships enjoy a right of transit passage through international straits used for navigation, and a coastal state may not levy a charge purely for that passage. It may, however, recover the cost of specific services it actually renders, such as traffic management, escort, or pilotage. Framing the payments as fees for navigational services is Iran’s attempt to keep the scheme on the lawful side of that line. Most maritime lawyers and the affected governments read it the other way: a toll on passage, dressed as a service.

Is paying cheaper than rerouting?

For many cargoes, yes, which is the uncomfortable logic that makes the scheme work. Diverting a tanker around the Cape of Good Hope adds roughly two weeks each way, burning fuel, tying up the vessel, and pushing back delivery. For a single voyage that detour can cost well into seven figures once charter time and bunkers are counted, in the same order of magnitude as the fee plus the war-risk premium. When the buyer has no flexibility on timing, paying Iran to cross can pencil out as the cheaper option. That is precisely why a fee regime, rather than a hard blockade, can extract revenue: it sets a price just below the cost of the next-best route. The full reroute math sits on our Cape of Good Hope page.

What it earns Iran.

Even at sharply reduced traffic, the arithmetic is large. Public estimates put potential collections at up to $3 billion a year at current depressed volumes, rising toward $8 billion if traffic were to return to pre-conflict levels of roughly 140 vessels a day. Those are projections, not booked revenue, and they assume operators keep paying rather than abandoning the route. But they explain why the fee has become a central bargaining chip in the indirect US–Iran talks: it is a durable revenue stream Iran would be giving up in any deal that fully reopens the strait.

What the fee signals.

A transit fee is not a reopening. It is the price of a controlled, partial flow: enough vessels cleared to generate revenue and project normalcy, far too few to count as open commercial traffic. Read it alongside the live throughput, carrier posture, and war-risk multiple on the live tracker. When you see the strait described as “reopening” on the strength of a few fee-paying transits, this is the regime doing the talking, not a return to the pre-crisis baseline. Whether the strait is genuinely closed right now is answered, with the live indicators, on our status page.

Caveats on the figures.

Iran does not publish a fee schedule. The numbers here are an editorial reading of trade-press and wire reporting, and they move. Per-vessel charges are negotiated and vary by ship and cargo; revenue figures are analysts’ projections, not audited receipts. Treat every figure as “as reported, as of June 2026,” and check the linked sources for the current state. If you have better primary documentation, send a correction.