Reference · Updated October 21, 2026
The Strait of Hormuz transit fee.
For the first time, crossing the Strait of Hormuz costs money paid to Iran. A waterway that carried roughly a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil as an open right of passage is now a permission, granted ship by ship and priced in the millions. Here is what is being charged, who collects it, and whether paying beats sailing around Africa.
Update · October 21, 2026
The Islamabad Memorandum, a 14-point framework signed June 17, 2026 by President Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian and brokered by Pakistan, suspended the per-vessel toll regime described on this page for a 60-day window alongside a ceasefire extension and an end to the US naval blockade. The deal did not hold: within days the ceasefire frayed, Iran re-declared the strait closed, and the US and Iran resumed strikes, so the toll regime’s status is once again contested. The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to commercial traffic since February 28, 2026. Iran re-declared it closed after the July ceasefire collapsed, and the war has spread to a second chokepoint, where control of the Yemeni side of the Bab el-Mandeb is contested: the Houthis took it in September, Yemen's Saudi-backed government said on October 5 that it had retaken the coast up to Mocha, the Houthis deny it, and Reuters couldn't verify the claim. US forces have destroyed Iranian tankers and Iran has fired missiles at US warships and bases, while merchant ships are being hit at more than one a day: a projectile hit the Kuwaiti supertanker Al Funtas in the strait on the evening of September 28, three more ships were hit on September 29, the Kuwaiti supertanker Kazimah III was set on fire on October 1, two more tankers were reported hit on October 2, on October 4 the product tanker Lipsi was hit in the engine room and left drifting, two more tankers were struck on the evening of October 4, a tanker was hit on October 5 and reported an engine-room fire, the LNG carrier Maran Gas Mystras was hit leaving the strait around October 4, on October 6 a projectile hit the Panama-flagged On Peace off Oman, injuring 12 of her crew, 11 of them Indian, per India's foreign ministry, and on the evening of October 7 UKMTO said a tanker about 51 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, off Qatar, was hit by multiple projectiles with casualties; maritime security sources later named her as the chemical tanker Acers, with minor crew injuries, per Reuters. Reuters, citing three maritime security sources, reported on October 7 that at least 12 attacks hit tankers around the strait in the week of September 28 to October 5, the most in any week since the war began. The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre hasn't said who fired. The Guard-linked Fars news agency said on October 3 that the Revolutionary Guard's navy had targeted seven "violating" tankers in five days, and Iranian state media say three Emirati tankers among those hit were on Iran's non-compliance list. On October 5 Guard forces warned a tanker north of Khasab, Oman, that it would be targeted unless it turned back, and it complied, per UKMTO. On September 23 a seafarer was killed when projectiles hit the bulk carrier Cape Dao off Oman. Drones launched from Iraq shut Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, the largest route around the strait, on September 11; it restarted at a low rate on September 22 and loadings at Yanbu resumed within the week, with Kpler putting flow near 2.65 million barrels a day on September 28, about half the pre-attack rate, per Reuters as carried by Baird Maritime; Saudi Aramco hasn't confirmed a figure. How much is moving is contested, and the answer depends on what is counted. Reuters, on provisional Kpler data, reported on October 5 that Middle East crude exports topped their pre-war average of about 18 million barrels a day on four days in late September. That total leans on routes around the strait and on ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman: DW, citing Kpler, says about 40% of the crude left the Gulf without crossing the strait in September. The National, citing Kpler, puts flows through the strait itself at 6.02 million barrels a day in September, less than a third of February's. Vessel counts, ours included, stay far below pre-war levels, though they can't see tankers that cross with AIS off. On the talks, foreign minister Abbas Araghchi set out a seven-day plan on September 25: the United States would release frozen assets, lift oil sanctions and end its blockade, fighting would stop, and Iran would reopen the strait within the week. President Trump rejected it in public on September 26, and on September 30 Iran said it had received a US response, whose terms haven't been published. On October 4 parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said the strait won't open until Iran's seven conditions, which he said rest on the June Islamabad Memorandum, are met; CNBC says they include an end to the US blockade and the release of Iranian assets. On October 1 the United States added sanctions on Iran's rail system and a shadow banking network. On October 6 President Trump said the strait "belongs to the United States of America" and that US forces sink Iranian ships that run the blockade with no oil aboard. Iran's oil minister, Mohsen Paknejad, resigned on October 4 with crude exports stalled under the blockade, and Hamid Bovard of the National Iranian Oil Company is acting minister, per Bloomberg. On October 7 Revolutionary Guard adviser Mohammad Reza Naqdi said, per the Guard-linked Fars agency, that the strait stays closed until Iran's demands are met and that routes Iran calls illegal will soon be blocked. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the strait is open and Iran has lost control of it, and US Central Command called the closure claim false. Vice President JD Vance told Reuters that Iran must make a meaningful cut to its enrichment capacity, and a senior Iranian official told Reuters that Washington must first meet Tehran's conditions before nuclear talks can start. On October 8 President Trump said the US won't attack Iran before the November 3 midterm elections and that the blockade stays in force, and Iran said it would answer Washington's reply to its seven-day plan within a few days. On October 9 Iranian media reported that tankers on routes Iran hasn't approved may have hit mines, which no maritime authority has confirmed and US Central Command disputes, saying it has cleared the primary lanes. The same day the Revolutionary Guard claimed a strike on an LPG tanker it named as the NV Sunshine, which no maritime authority has confirmed, and said ships using routes Iran hasn't approved will be pursued across the region, not only in the strait. Separately, UKMTO logged a projectile strike and fire on a vessel about 13 nautical miles west of Al Jazeera, UAE, without naming the ship or who fired. US Central Command says it had redirected 133 commercial vessels under the blockade by October 9, and Brent settled at $104.72 that day, per our own feed. On October 10 and 11 UKMTO reported more outbound tankers hit on the port side by projectiles, with the crews reported safe, per gCaptain, and gCaptain counted six vessels reported struck in and around the strait on October 11. The Guard said supertankers had hit mines on October 10 and 11, then a third on October 12, none confirmed by a maritime authority, per Mehr and Anadolu, and its navy chief said ships that switch off their tracking will be treated as hostile, per Mehr. On October 10 US Central Command said a US fighter jet disabled the propulsion of the Panama-flagged cargo ship Ocean Molica in the Gulf of Oman, with her crew unharmed, per Reuters. On the evening of October 12 UKMTO reported a products tanker and then three vessels struck by unknown projectiles, and none of the reports says who fired. On the talks, Mohsen Rezaei, whom Reuters calls Iran's security chief, called Washington's reply to Iran's seven conditions "insufficient" on October 11, and on October 12 foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iran is still reviewing the reply and will answer through intermediaries, per MarineLink. Fitch said it expects a durable deal to reopen the strait in early 2027, per Anadolu. On the second front, a Houthi missile struck Riyadh's main airport on October 10, killing 12 people, per Saudi Arabia's civil aviation authority; an injured man later died, bringing the toll to 13, and a second strike on October 11 killed one more, per Al Jazeera. On October 13 the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi oil sites in Yemen, per AFP, while President Trump said the US may join Saudi strikes on the Houthis. On October 13 UKMTO reported two more ships hit by projectiles with minor damage, the International Monetary Fund cut its 2026 growth forecasts for Gulf economies because of the prolonged closure, per The National, and Brent settled at $105.69, per Al Jazeera. On October 14 a container ship sank near the strait: the Guard said a ship carrying more than 2,500 containers hit a mine, per AP, while maritime security sources told Reuters the Singapore-flagged GFS Pride sank after a projectile hit her. Singapore's port authority said all 21 of her crew were evacuated and that her sister ship GFS Giselle, hit on October 14, reached anchorage with her crew safe. The bulk carrier Cape Dao, hit on September 23, has also sunk, and per IMO casualty data GFS Pride and Cape Dao are the second and third ships sunk since February 28, per Reuters. UKMTO counted 15 attacks on ships from October 6 to October 14, 11 of them in the last four days, per Al Jazeera, and on October 16 BBC Verify said 12 vessels were struck in a week, a record. On October 15 US Central Command said the US and its partners control the strait, citing more than 40 commercial ships through it in 24 hours, and that a Guard projectile, not a mine, hit GFS Pride, per gCaptain; PortWatch counted about four crossings a day in the week to October 18. Iran's army chief said the strait stays closed until Iran's rights are respected, per IRNA, and on October 16 its army spokesman said it would reopen if the United States leaves the region, per CBS News. On October 18 foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran's seven-day plan is still on the table and urged Washington to accept it: the strait would reopen on the sixth day if the US meets Iran's conditions, with talks on a final deal on the seventh, per Reuters; Iran also threatened enormous damage if it is attacked. Iran's navy says more "violating" tankers have caught fire east of the strait, which no maritime authority has confirmed, and Reuters reported on October 16 that Iran has shipped some LPG and jet fuel since July despite the blockade. On October 17 the Guard said two supertankers hit mines and caught fire, per Reuters, and from the evening of October 18 Iranian media claimed another, per Mehr; no maritime authority has confirmed any of them. US Central Command said the vast majority of Iran's attempted attacks fail, and the US military said 97% of ships cross the strait safely. The IMO's chief urged ships to avoid the strait, per Xinhua, and the IMO put the number of trapped seafarers at about 6,000, per Fox News, and on October 19 a tanker was hit off Saudi Arabia's Gulf coast and her crew evacuated, per Naharnet. On October 20 the Guard said two more "violating" tankers hit mines in the strait and caught fire, and that it shot down a US MQ-9 drone, its 54th claimed; no maritime authority or US Central Command has confirmed either. UKMTO logged a report of a tanker incident involving military forces about 121 nautical miles east of Duqm, Oman, and Iran's strait authority says its non-compliance list now holds about 120 vessels, up from 82 at the start of October. On October 21 UKMTO said a projectile hit a tanker about 11 nautical miles west of Bukha, Oman, with her crew safe, and a Revolutionary Guard official said Iran could target the undersea internet cables in the strait if Iran is attacked. Brent touched $110 on October 16, per CNBC, settled at $109.86 that day, was near $108 on October 19 and traded near $111 on October 20, per our own feed. On October 15 missiles hit the presidential palace in Aden, killing five, per Al Jazeera, and Yemen's government blamed the Houthis. The charges below reflect the regime that was in force during the closure.
The longer-term picture is contested. Iran frames any future charges as “fees for services,” a distinction that matters under international law: UNCLOS bars tolls on transit passage through an international strait but permits charges for specific services actually rendered (such as traffic management or pilotage). The US and Gulf states oppose charges in either form. What Iran does now that the 60-day window has closed is unresolved. Iran’s lead negotiator, Ghalibaf, has said the strait will not return to pre-war conditions and that Iran intends to charge “fees for services” now that the deal’s 60-day toll-free window has expired. A parallel Omani proposal to formalize navigational fees, drafted with UN IMO involvement and under study by France and Britain, became the main vehicle for that dispute; the US opposes any Iranian-controlled charging regime. In a brief reversal, Washington itself floated a 20 percent Hormuz transit fee in mid-July before dropping the idea in favor of Gulf investment deals, as reported; its objection remains to a fee controlled by Iran, not to a charge in principle. On July 28 Oman put a fuller version of its plan to Tehran: joint regional management of the strait funded by voluntary user contributions on the model of the Strait of Malacca, leaving Iran without sole control. Iran rejected it, so the charging question is unsettled again. A US official has separately said any deal ending the war would carry no fees or tolls for passage at all, though that account rests on one unnamed source. Since then Iran has acted on its own: in late August it approved a schedule of service fees for the ships it authorises and blacklisted tankers it says broke its transit rules, a list that had grown to 77 vessels by September 14. On August 26 Iran’s military said it had reached a revenue-sharing agreement with Oman covering the strait, which Oman hasn’t confirmed. And on September 24 Reuters reported that negotiators were exploring a phased deal in which Tehran would move its demand for transit fees into a side attachment, so the fee is now a bargaining item in the wider talks, and nothing has been signed.
How much Iran was charging.
Reporting from the closure period puts the charge at up to $2 million per vessel, per voyage, with the exact figure scaled to the size of the ship, the type of cargo, and the volume carried. A fully laden crude tanker sat at the top of that range; smaller vessels paid less. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority was established around May 5–6, 2026, and the per-vessel fee mechanism rolled out in mid-May 2026.
In the economics of a single large-tanker voyage the fee is real but not, on its own, decisive. It lands on top of war-risk insurance that trade press already places as high as $10 million per Hormuz transit. The fee and the premium together are what an operator weighs against the alternative of not going at all.
Who collects it.
The mechanism was run by a body established in early May 2026, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). Vessels seeking passage applied in advance, disclosing ownership, insurance, crew manifest, and cargo, and were issued a permit only once vetted and scheduled. In practice that turned transit into a gated, case-by-case approval rather than the open passage the strait offered before the crisis. Iran selectively cleared vessels tied to a small set of states while the bulk of global carriers stayed away.
The United States responded by sanctioning the Iranian entity administering the charges, treating the toll apparatus itself as a target rather than recognizing it as a legitimate fee for service. Under the Islamabad Memorandum, the US naval blockade ends alongside the toll suspension, though the underlying sanctions posture toward the PGSA has not been publicly addressed. On July 7, 2026, following Iranian attacks on commercial ships in the strait, the US reimposed the oil sanctions it had lifted under the deal.
Tolls, or “navigational services”?
Iran is careful with the word. Its foreign ministry has said plainly that it does not charge tolls, while adding that “services will be provided” that “require charging fees.” The distinction is not just rhetoric. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, ships enjoy a right of transit passage through international straits used for navigation, and a coastal state may not levy a charge purely for that passage. It may, however, recover the cost of specific services it actually renders, such as traffic management, escort, or pilotage. Framing the payments as fees for navigational services is Iran’s attempt to keep the scheme on the lawful side of that line. Most maritime lawyers and the affected governments read it the other way: a toll on passage, dressed as a service.
Is paying cheaper than rerouting?
For many cargoes, yes, which is the uncomfortable logic that makes the scheme work. Diverting a tanker around the Cape of Good Hope adds roughly two weeks each way, burning fuel, tying up the vessel, and pushing back delivery. For a single voyage that detour can cost well into seven figures once charter time and bunkers are counted, in the same order of magnitude as the fee plus the war-risk premium. When the buyer has no flexibility on timing, paying Iran to cross can pencil out as the cheaper option. That is precisely why a fee regime, rather than a hard blockade, can extract revenue: it sets a price just below the cost of the next-best route. The full reroute math sits on our Cape of Good Hope page.
What it earns Iran.
No source we link prints a revenue total, so we don’t give one. What is clear is that the fee was a central bargaining chip in the US–Iran talks: a durable revenue stream Iran would give up in any deal that fully reopened the strait. The Islamabad Memorandum suspended collection for 60 days; whether Iran can reinstate any form of the regime after that window depends on how the broader settlement holds.
What the fee signaled.
A transit fee was not a reopening. It was the price of a controlled, partial flow: enough vessels cleared to generate revenue and project normalcy, far too few to count as open commercial traffic. The Islamabad Memorandum changed the frame: the 60-day toll-free window was a genuine suspension of the fee regime, not a fee-paying trickle dressed as normalcy. But with the ceasefire frayed and the strait contested again, that has not translated into a return to open commercial traffic; it now depends on the hostilities stopping for good and carriers re-entering. Follow the live throughput, carrier posture, and war-risk multiple on the live tracker. Whether the strait is genuinely open right now is answered, with the live indicators, on our status page.
Caveats on the figures.
Iran did not publish a fee schedule. The numbers here are an editorial reading of trade-press and wire reporting from the closure period. Per-vessel charges were negotiated and varied by ship and cargo; revenue figures are analysts’ projections, not audited receipts. The Islamabad Memorandum suspended collection for 60 days, so figures in the active-toll sections above reflect the pre-deal regime. Treat every figure as “as reported, closure period through June 17, 2026,” and check the linked sources for the current state. If you have better primary documentation, send a correction.
Sources & further reading
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