The Strait of Hormuz transit fee.

How much Iran was charging.

Reporting from the closure period puts the charge at roughly $1 million to $2 million per vessel, per voyage, with the exact figure scaled to the size of the ship, the type of cargo, and the volume carried. A fully laden crude tanker sat at the top of that range; smaller vessels paid less. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority was established around May 5–6, 2026, and the per-vessel fee mechanism rolled out in mid-May 2026.

In the economics of a single large-tanker voyage the fee is real but not, on its own, decisive. It lands on top of war-risk insurance that trade press already places in the $2 to $2.5 million range per Hormuz transit. The fee and the premium together are what an operator weighs against the alternative of not going at all.

Who collects it.

The mechanism was run by a body established in early May 2026, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). Vessels seeking passage applied in advance, disclosing ownership, insurance, crew manifest, and cargo, and were issued a permit only once vetted and scheduled. In practice that turned transit into a gated, case-by-case approval rather than the open passage the strait offered before the crisis. Iran selectively cleared vessels tied to a small set of states while the bulk of global carriers stayed away.

The United States responded by sanctioning the Iranian entity administering the charges, treating the toll apparatus itself as a target rather than recognizing it as a legitimate fee for service. Under the Islamabad Memorandum, the US naval blockade ends alongside the toll suspension, though the underlying sanctions posture toward the PGSA has not been publicly addressed. On July 7, 2026, following Iranian attacks on commercial ships in the strait, the US reimposed the oil sanctions it had lifted under the deal.

Tolls, or “navigational services”?

Iran is careful with the word. Its foreign ministry has said plainly that it does not charge tolls, while adding that “services will be provided” that “require charging fees.” The distinction is not just rhetoric. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, ships enjoy a right of transit passage through international straits used for navigation, and a coastal state may not levy a charge purely for that passage. It may, however, recover the cost of specific services it actually renders, such as traffic management, escort, or pilotage. Framing the payments as fees for navigational services is Iran’s attempt to keep the scheme on the lawful side of that line. Most maritime lawyers and the affected governments read it the other way: a toll on passage, dressed as a service.

Is paying cheaper than rerouting?

For many cargoes, yes, which is the uncomfortable logic that makes the scheme work. Diverting a tanker around the Cape of Good Hope adds roughly two weeks each way, burning fuel, tying up the vessel, and pushing back delivery. For a single voyage that detour can cost well into seven figures once charter time and bunkers are counted, in the same order of magnitude as the fee plus the war-risk premium. When the buyer has no flexibility on timing, paying Iran to cross can pencil out as the cheaper option. That is precisely why a fee regime, rather than a hard blockade, can extract revenue: it sets a price just below the cost of the next-best route. The full reroute math sits on our Cape of Good Hope page.

What it earns Iran.

Even at sharply reduced traffic, the arithmetic is large. Public estimates put potential collections at up to $3 billion a year at current depressed volumes, rising toward $8 billion if traffic were to return to the pre-conflict JMIC average of roughly 138 merchant vessels a day (all transits, both directions; the IMF PortWatch commercial baseline this site tracks counts ~88/day). Those are projections, not booked revenue, and they assumed operators would keep paying rather than abandoning the route. They also explain why the fee was a central bargaining chip in the US–Iran talks: a durable revenue stream Iran would give up in any deal that fully reopened the strait. The Islamabad Memorandum suspended collection for 60 days; whether Iran can reinstate any form of the regime after that window depends on how the broader settlement holds.

What the fee signaled.

A transit fee was not a reopening. It was the price of a controlled, partial flow: enough vessels cleared to generate revenue and project normalcy, far too few to count as open commercial traffic. The Islamabad Memorandum changed the frame: the 60-day toll-free window was a genuine suspension of the fee regime, not a fee-paying trickle dressed as normalcy. But with the ceasefire frayed and the strait contested again, that has not translated into a return to open commercial traffic; it now depends on the hostilities stopping for good and carriers re-entering. Follow the live throughput, carrier posture, and war-risk multiple on the live tracker. Whether the strait is genuinely open right now is answered, with the live indicators, on our status page.

Caveats on the figures.

Iran did not publish a fee schedule. The numbers here are an editorial reading of trade-press and wire reporting from the closure period. Per-vessel charges were negotiated and varied by ship and cargo; revenue figures are analysts’ projections, not audited receipts. The Islamabad Memorandum suspends collection for 60 days, so figures in the active-toll sections above reflect the pre-deal regime. Treat every figure as “as reported, closure period through June 17, 2026,” and check the linked sources for the current state. If you have better primary documentation, send a correction.