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India & the Strait of Hormuz.

India's Hormuz exposure has changed shape, not size. Russian Urals, bought at discount through Cape and Suez, now displace Gulf barrels in the import mix, but the absolute volumes still flowing through Hormuz remain large, and the LNG side is more concentrated than crude. The strategic reserve is the smallest of any major importer at roughly 75 days, with expansion under way. India's downstream story is the more interesting one: Jamnagar and Vadinar refine that crude into the diesel and jet that, post-2022, increasingly land in Europe. The geometry of any Hormuz closure therefore matters in three directions for India simultaneously: import cost on the Gulf side, freight cost on the Cape route, and refining margin on the European arbitrage. Operation Sankalp formalises the navy's standing presence to escort Indian-flagged tankers.

Strait status now

EFFECTIVELY CLOSED

Crude imports via Hormuz

62%

Daily import value at risk

$214M

at $73.34/bbl Brent

Strategic reserve

75d

days of net imports

Energy profile

Oil consumption
5.4 mbpd
Crude imports
4.7 mbpd
Hormuz crude dependency
62%
Hormuz LNG dependency
45%
Reserve days
75d
Reserve volume
39 mbbl

Top suppliers

  1. 01Russia· largest, post-2022
  2. 02Iraq
  3. 03Saudi Arabia
  4. 04United Arab Emirates
  5. 05United States

Key facts

  • World's third-largest crude importer; first-quartile growth in oil demand.
  • Diversified rapidly to discounted Russian Urals after 2022; Hormuz share has fallen but remains the majority of non-Russian crude.
  • Strategic reserve is the smallest among major importers in days-of-supply terms.
  • Refining capacity at Jamnagar (Reliance) and Vadinar (Nayara) makes India a major refined-products exporter to Europe.
  • Indian Navy maintains a continuous presence in the Gulf of Oman (Operation Sankalp).

Vulnerabilities

  • Reserve cushion is roughly 75 days, far below OECD norms.
  • A closure with Russian crude blockaded by sanctions would be uniquely punishing.
  • Domestic LPG supply for households is heavily Qatar-linked; consumer price political sensitivity is high.
  • Refining-to-export economics depend on stable Cape-route freight rates.

Mitigations

  • Russian crude diversification (now ~35% of imports) reduced Hormuz share materially.
  • Strategic reserve expansion under way at Padur and Chandikhol; total target is 90+ days.
  • Long-term LNG contracts with Qatar, the US, and ADNOC.
  • Refinery investment in alternative grades to keep Jamnagar utilisation high during disruptions.
  • Operation Sankalp: Indian Navy escorts for Indian-flagged tankers in the Gulf.

Historical context

Through the 1990s and 2000s India built a refining-led growth model premised on cheap Gulf crude and global products markets. The 2022 sanctions on Russian oil unexpectedly broadened that model: India became the swing buyer of discounted Urals and a primary supplier of refined products to Europe, but only as long as the Cape route remains operationally cheap.